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Abstract  
International empirical evidence shows that fiscal policy in developing countries is largely procyclical, opposite 
to what is held by neo-classical and Keynesian theories and to the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in G-7 
countries. This paper examines the cyclicality of fiscal behavior in 12 developing countries of OPEC during 
1990–2009. After testing fiscal measure - government expenditure - and correcting for reverse causality between 
non-oil output and fiscal variables, the results suggest that fiscal variable is strongly procyclical in the full 
sample. From the results, it can be interpreted that fiscal behavior is more procyclical when the bureaucracy 
quality, the constraints on the executive and political competition are low. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 10 years, a large and growing literature has argued that there is a fundamental difference between 
how fiscal policy is conducted in developing countries compared to industrial countries. While fiscal policy in 
industrial countries is either acyclical or countercyclical, fiscal policy in developing countries is, by and large, 
pro-cyclical. Gavin and Perotti (1997) were the first to call attention to the fact that fiscal policy in Latin 
America appeared to be pro-cyclical. Talvi and Végh (2005) then claimed that, far from being a Latin-American 
phenomenon, pro-cyclical fiscal policy seemed to be the rule in all of the developing world. In fact, in Talvi and 
Végh's (2005) study, the correlation between the cyclical component of government consumption and GDP is 
positive for each of the 36 developing countries in their sample (with an average of 0.53). In sharp contrast, the 
average correlation for G7 countries is zero. By now, a large number of authors have reached similar conclusions 
to the point that the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries has become part of the conventional 
wisdom.  
Perhaps the more convincing evidence that this idea has indeed become conventional wisdom is the 
explosion of theoretical models trying to explain such a puzzle. In other words, why would developing countries 
pursue a pro-cyclical fiscal policy that might exacerbate the business cycle? An all too brief review of the 
literature reveals that explanations follow two main strands: (a) imperfections in international credit markets that 
prevent developing countries from borrowing in bad times (Gavin and Perotti (1997), Riascos and Végh (2003), 
Guerson (2003), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), and Susuki (2006)); and (b) 
political economy explanations typically based on the idea that good times encourage fiscal profligacy and/or 
rent-seeking activities: (Tornell and Lane (1998, 1999), Talvi and Végh (2005), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), 
and Ilzetzki (2007)). 
But do we really know what we think we know? Put differently, is it really the case that government 
spending responds positively (in a causal sense) to the business cycle in developing countries? While a positive 
correlation between the cyclical component of government consumption and GDP certainly gives no indication 
of causality, the literature has implicitly assumed that the causality goes from the business cycle to fiscal policy. 
But is this a reasonable inference? No, according to the insightful comments of Roberto Rigobon on Kaminsky, 
Reinhart, and Végh (2004). In fact, Rigobon has argued that, if anything, the structure of shocks in developing 
and industrial countries is such that it is more likely that reverse causality explains the observed patterns in the 
data (i.e., fiscal policy is driving output). In a similar vein, the numerous papers that have purported to establish 
that fiscal policy is pro-cyclical by regressing some measure of fiscal policy on some measure of the business 
cycle- while controlling for other factors- have essentially ignored the problem of endogeneity. What if 
accounting for endogeneity were to make the pro-cyclical results disappear? This is precisely the argument made 
by Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) who claim that, once GDP has been suitably instrumented for, causality runs in 
the opposite direction (i.e., from fiscal policy to GDP). But, surprisingly enough, there is little systematic work 
in this area. This would seem to be a major shortcoming, given that if fiscal policy in developing countries is not 
really pro-cyclical, all the existing theory would be essentially irrelevant. 
In addition to the obvious academic interest of this question, its relevance for public policy is hard to 
understate. In fact, the ability to transition from a pro-cyclical fiscal policy to an acyclical or countercyclical 
policy is viewed as a badge of macroeconomic honor in the developing world and as a sign that the country 
belongs to an exclusive club that relies on sound fiscal and monetary policies. If pro-cyclical fiscal policy just 
reflects reverse causality, then clearly this way of thinking would be completely unfounded. 
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The main purpose of this paper is thus to ask: Is fiscal policy really pro-cyclical in developing 
countries? How do we proceed? After discussing some empirical studies in Section 2, Section 3 develops model 
specification. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. Literature Review 
In the last decade, an important part of literature associated with fiscal policy has been addressing the issue of 
cyclicality. Several factors hamper the ability of developing countries to adopt optimal stabilization policies. 
These factors can be classified in two groups. The first corresponds to factors associated to the integration 
(access) to domestic and international financial markets. The main idea is that the limited access to domestic or 
external funds may hinder the ability of government to pursue expansionary fiscal policies in bad times. The 
second group of factors is associated to theories where the institutional framework plays a key role. Within this 
group, one standard of the theory suggests that countries pursuing poor fiscal policies also have weak 
institutions. 
 
2.1 Structural determinants 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) argue that governments in developing countries are unable to run countercyclical fiscal 
policies due to the rigorous credit constraints that avoid them from borrowing during downturns. Additionally, 
these governments are constrained to repay their debt, which, in consequence, forced them to adopt procyclical 
fiscal policy. 
Kaminsky, et al., (2004) and Alesina and Tabellini (2005) give evidence that capital inflows to 
developing countries are procyclical meaning that countries tend to borrow in good times and repay in bad times. 
This procyclical access to international capital markets forced developing countries to adopt procyclical fiscal 
policies. To avoid the limited access to international capital markets, in bad times, government adopts fiscal 
adjustment. If investors raise doubts on the ability of governments to implement required adjustment, 
creditworthiness would weaken and further financing would disappear. 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) invoke the limited financial depth to explain procyclical fiscal 
policy in developing countries. Accordingly, when economy faces financial constraint to borrow, increasing 
government spending may crowd out private investment and, hence, may be contractionary. Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2004) point out that the contractionary effects of expansionary fiscal policies can be exacerbated 
if these policies lead to a deterioration of the quality of country’s assets.  
Aguiar, et al., (2005) provide explanations about the observed procyclicality of fiscal policies in 
emerging markets and present another mechanism through which fiscal policy amplifies the business cycle. 
Their explanation relies on two features of emerging markets: limited access to financial markets and limited 
commitment to fiscal policy. They present a small open economy model with capital where a government 
maximizes the utility of a working population that has no access to financial markets and is subject to 
endowment shocks. The government's insurance motive generates procyclical taxes on capital income. If the 
government lacks commitment, its fiscal policy can be distortionary. Hence, the government has stronger 
incentives to tax capital in the future if the economy is in recession, thus reducing capital investment, amplifying 
and extending the downturn. 
 
2.2 Institutional and Political determinants 
Tornell and lane (1999) introduce the notion of “voracity effect” to explain the overspending of transitory 
increases in fiscal revenues. A positive shock to income leads to more than proportional increase in public 
spending, even if the shock is expected to be temporary. This, in turn, is the consequence of weak institution 
framework and the presence of multiple powerful groups in fiscal process. 
Woo (2009) emphasizes the role of social polarization to understand procyclical fiscal stances in a 
number of countries. When there is polarization of social preferences over public choices, the incentives become 
greater for policymakers to implement their preferred policies. This individual rationality may threaten 
efficiency for the economy. According to the author, such incentives may become particularly stronger during 
boom periods, since increased revenues or new resources make their preferred policies seem easier to implement, 
thus producing procyclical fiscal policies. 
Talvi and Végh (2005) argue that the variability of tax bases in developing countries can explain 
procyclicality in these countries. They developed an optimal fiscal policy model including a political distortion, 
which makes it costly to run budget surpluses due to the pressures that abandon fiscal resources created to 
increase public spending. Given this political distortion, a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax 
bases will choose to worse taxes in good times to dissuaded spending pressures. Given this political distortion, 
the best way to avoid a high growth in expenditure is to lower tax rates. This procyclical behavior is a second-
best response to that political distortion. 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) try to explain why countries follow seemingly sub optimal procyclical 
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fiscal policies that add to macroeconomic instability. To answer this question they adopt a political approach as 
Talvi and Végh (2005) and focus on diving political distortions. In this paper voters face corrupt government that 
can appropriate part of tax revenues to finance unproductive public consumption. When voters realize that a 
positive income shock has affected the economy, they manifest an immediate welfare like tax cuts or increases in 
productive government spending and transfers. This political distortion leads to excessive accumulation of 
government debt and procyclical fiscal policy during both boom and recession and should be more prevalent in 
countries where political corruption is prevalent and the government is responsible to the voters. Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005) criticize the relevance of credit constrain argument (Gavin and Perotti (1997), Kaminski, 
Reinhart and Végh (2004), Riascos and Végh (2003)) and explain that political distortion may drive government 
to attempt an unsustainable level of debt corresponding to what they can repay and therefore at the limit of what 
borrowers can lend. Consequently, credit constrain is a direct consequence of the political agency problem and 
implies that fiscal policy should be procyclical only in recession. 
 
3. Empirical specification and results 
The following empirical model specification, which is widely used in the literature (Gavin and Perotti (1997), 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Lledo, et al., (2009)) has been chosen. 
∆(log(Fiscalt))= α+ β∆(log(non-oil GDPit))+ θ∆(log(TOTit))+ δ∆(log(Fiscalit-1))+ δZit+ ηi + eit                                                                                                                             
(1) 
where Fiscal represents a fiscal variable. The independent variables on the right-hand side are non-oil 
GDP, an index of the country’s terms of trade, TOT, the lagged fiscal variable, a set of other control variables as 
Z, fiscal shocks as eit and ηi as an unobserved, country fixed effect. The i and t denote the country and the time 
period, respectively. Equation (1) is a fiscal reaction function where fiscal policy responds to contemporaneous 
output changes, terms of trade, the lagged fiscal variable, other control variables, and fiscal shocks (eit). The 
terms of trade variable is important for developing countries in general but especially for OPEC, as their fiscal 
balances and economies are highly prone to terms of trade shocks, which usually originate from outside the 
domestic economy. Each individual country does not have control over the oil price; thus, including TOT 
provides a control for external shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the shocks to the fiscal balance or policy 
decisions in the previous year may have lasting effects on the following period, so the lagged dependent variable 
is included in the specification to allow for long-term mean reversion in fiscal behavior. The cyclicality of fiscal 
policy is determined by gauging the sign and the size of coefficient β, which measures the elasticity of the fiscal 
variable with respect to output growth. When fiscal policy is pro-cyclical, a positive β for most of the fiscal 
measures, except for the non-oil primary balance, is expected. Government expenditure, consumption, revenues, 
and investment should move in the same direction as output. If output increases during booms, the fiscal 
variables also increase, while the opposite happens in recessions. An estimated β value above 1 implies a more-
than-proportionate response of the fiscal variable to output fluctuations. 
The key explanatory variable is the growth of real GDP, excluding the oil sector (non-oil GDP). Non-
oil GDP is more relevant to assess the status of economic conditions and the use of the labor factor, as the oil 
sector is typically an enclave sector, highly capital intensive with limited spillovers to the rest of the economy. 
Similarly, Barnett and Ossowski (2002), among others, argue that non-oil measures are more reliable variables 
of fiscal policy in OPCs than the overall balance, since oil revenue originates from abroad and non-oil variables 
are largely under the control of the authorities. The fiscal measurement used as dependent variables is real total 
general government expenditure. 
As indicators of institutional quality and political structure, several variables from the International 
Country Risk Guide database are used: bureaucracy quality, and law and order. In addition, the composite index 
of institutional quality will be included, representing all of these. Furthermore, for political structure, variables 
such as political competition, democracy, constraints on the decision-making authority, and checks and balances 
from the Polity IV Project data set will be added. 
In this linear panel framework, pooled OLS and dynamic fixed-effect estimations assume strict 
exogeneity of explanatory variables; however, this does not hold for this specification, and they produce biased 
and inconsistent estimators. Similarly, the instrumental variable estimates are also biased, and the precision of 
the instrumental variable estimates is lower than that of the OLS estimates. In the presence of weak instruments, 
the loss of precision will be severe, and the instrumental variable estimates may be no improvement over the 
OLS (Baum, 2007). However, all sources of endogeneity bias can be addressed by using GMM estimators 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991), as is commonly used in the literature. 
In the first step of our analysis, it is crucial to ascertain the integrational properties of the data series. In 
a panel data model, when the presence of a unit root in a model is admitted, one may obtain apparently 
significant relationships from unrelated variables. This phenomenon is called the spurious regression problem. In 
order to test the data stationary and the order of integration of variables, we apply two conventional unit root 
tests, Im et al., (2003) and levin el al., (2002) (hear after IPS and LLC). These tests are widely known and 
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understood, so we refrain from repeating the methodology here. The results in table 1 indicate that there is no 
presence of unit root. The IPS and LLC tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, showing that all variables 
used in the study are stationary at level. 
Table 1: Unit root test 
Variables IPS LLC 
fiscal  -3.68 
(0.000) 
-11.35 
(0.000) 
non-oil GDP -18.58 
(0.000) 
-18.47 
(0.000) 
TOT -6.35 
(0.000) 
-6.02 
(0.000) 
bureaucracy quality -4.73 
(0.000) 
-6.19 
(0.000) 
law and order -3.79 
(0.000) 
-6.66 
(0.000) 
composite index of institutional quality -5.90 
(0.000) 
-6.51 
(0.000) 
political competition -9.10 
(0.000) 
-6.00 
(0.000) 
democracy -4.67 
(0.004) 
-5.96 
(0.000) 
constraints on the decision-making authority -6.54 
(0.002) 
-8.57 
(0.000) 
checks and balances -7.64 
(0.000) 
-9.43 
(0.000) 
Note: P values in parentheses 
Source: Own elaboration 
Various econometric approaches have been used to estimate the before mentioned function relying largely on 
cross-sectional (and more recently, panel) data by OLS or GLS. However, the possibility of existing endogeneity 
of variables in a model using macro variables should be bear in mind. In this case, two stage least squares 
(2SLS) or generalized method of moments (GMM) are suggested as remedy. GMM does not require complete 
knowledge of the distribution of the data and it ensures consistency and efficiency while dealing with 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. It undertakes the issue of persistence of fiscal variable performance 
over time by including lagged dependent variable in the regression, since, a simple panel analysis, either with 
fixed or random effects, is generally not sufficient to fully investigate the lag structures inherent in a 
macroeconomic variable. It also handled the potential bias that could be created by inclusion of dependent 
variable in the regression. The particular approach we adopt is based on the GMM estimators for panel data 
model and is due to Arellano and Bond (1991).  
The Sargan test is designed to test the validity of the instruments, employed to estimate the model, by analyzing 
the sample analog of the moment conditions. It attempts to answer the question, given that a subset of 
instrumental variables is valid and exactly identifies the coefficients, are the extra instrumental variables valid? 
Failure to reject the null should be interpreted as favoring the specified model. Also, we apply Arellano–Bond 
test for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. Table 2 presents the outcome. Based on the Sargan test, 
the null hypothesis of the validity of the instrumental variable cannot be rejected, i.e. the instrument passes the 
test and errors are independently distributed. The results for 1st and 2nd –order serial correlation report the fact 
that the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors is appropriate.  
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Table 2: GMM Estimation 1990-2009 
Variables Coefficient Z P>|Z| 
Fiscal 0.336 59.65 0.000 
non-oil GDP 0.785 13.47 0.000 
TOT 0.0023 32.3 0.000 
bureaucracy quality -0.874 -8.36 0.000 
law and order 0.000 5.26 0.000 
composite index of institutional quality -0.1215 -7.02 0.000 
political competition -0.547 -6.25 0.000 
democracy 0.154 7.25 0.003 
constraints on the decision-making authority -0.145 -4.587 0.000 
checks and balances 0.000 -5.578 0.009 
Wald Chi2  586.06   
Sargan 60.78 (1.000)    
A(1)  -3.97 (0.0001)    
A(2)  1.001 (0.4658)    
Source: Own elaboration 
*Sargan is asymptotically distributed as a Chi2 under the null of instrument 
validity, with p-value in parentheses. 
**A1 and A2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in 
the first differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as a Chi2 under the 
null of no serial correlation, with p-value in parentheses. 
Finally, the estimation results for the sample, including the institutional and political control variables, 
are presented in Table 2. The estimated coefficient for fiscal variable for the sample is positive and statistically 
significant. Non-oil revenue growth is strongly procyclical, suggesting an increased tax collection as well as 
spillover effects of increased oil revenues. Among the political variables, bureaucracy quality, democracy, 
constraints on the decision-making authority (constraints on the executive), political competition, and checks and 
balances are significant. Except for democracy and checks and balances, the coefficients for the other variables 
are negative. From these results, it can be interpreted that fiscal behavior is more procyclical when the 
bureaucracy quality, the constraints on the executive and political competition are low. The coefficient for 
checks and balances is significant but very small. The coefficient for democracy is positive, indicating the higher 
the democracy variable, the higher is the expenditure, which partially supports the claim of Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005) that corrupt governments in democracies run procyclical fiscal policies. 
 
4. Conclusion 
International empirical evidence shows that fiscal policy in developing countries is largely procyclical, opposite 
to what is held by neo-classical and Keynesian theories and to the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in G-7 
countries. This paper analyzes the cyclicality of fiscal behavior thoroughly in 12 OPEC during 1990- 2009. By 
using GMM approach, we found support for the existence of procyclical fiscal policies in developing countries. 
We also added some political variables. The results show that bureaucracy quality, democracy, constraints on the 
decision-making authority (constraints on the executive), political competition, and checks and balances are 
significant. Except for democracy and checks and balances, the coefficients for the other variables are negative.  
In many developing countries, like OPEC, fiscal policy is procyclical. Our explanation is that rational 
voters do not trust corrupt governments with resources. When voters realize that a positive income shock has hit 
the economy, they demand immediate benefits in the form of tax cuts or increases in productive government 
spending or transfers. They fear that otherwise the available extra resources would be “wasted” in rents. Faced 
with these procyclical demands by voters, governments do not accumulate reserves in good times, on the 
contrary they incur large debts. 
OPCE face volatile and unpredictable oil revenues, a situation that makes fiscal management 
challenging. For this reason, it is imperative for them to formulate effective countercyclical fiscal policies by 
which they can smooth government expenditure, decouple it from the volatile oil revenues, and prevent boom-
and-bust cycles. Breaking away from a procyclical fiscal policy will enable them to sustain long-term growth 
and keep the safety net that the poor need. Sound fiscal policies and discipline require strong institutions, a 
higher-level bureaucracy, and more transparency. Strong institutions and transparency would also help reduce 
the voracity effect, which, in turn, would facilitate the accumulation of financial assets and build up confidence 
among investors to raise funds when needed. 
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